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 Since 1991, the Federative Republic of Brazil prohibits the import of used 
goods. However, following the creation of the Southern Common Market – 
Mercosur – and the consequential commitments of free trade, particularly the 
Decision nº22, adopted in 2000, Brazil creates a variety of legal instruments on the 
import and management of retreated tires that actually result on trade restrictions. 
In 2001, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, an exporter of retreated tires, ignited the 
Mercosur´s Dispute Settlement Mechanism to challenge the Brazilian restrictive 
measures on retreated tires that economically affected the Uruguayan industry. In 
the end, the Ad Hoc Tribunal finally decided the challenged measures did not 
follow, indeed, the Mercosur dispositions, and Brazil changed its rules accordingly.  
 As the restrictive measures continued to countries other than those part to 
the Mercosur, in 2006 another retreated tires exporter, the European Union, comes 
before the World Trade Organization – WTO – to challenge the Brasilia´s Policy 
and thus setting the first WTO case in which a developed country challenges an 
environmental measure taken by a developing country. 
 What is the most remarkable in the present case, however, is how the 
Brazilian response to the complaints abruptly shifted from a mere juridical ground, 
within the Mercosur, into an environmental one, within the WTO. That is, if before 
the Mercosur Ad Hoc Tribunal, Brazil insisted that the prohibition of retreated tires 
import was not an illegal extension but rather a mere explanation of the prior 
Portaria No. 8/91that prohibited every used goods; before the WTO though, Brazil 
makes a dramatic exposition on fire, health and environmental hazards that the 
“short lifespan retreated tires” were to inflict on Brazilian territory. 
 Why? At a first sight, the first reason that comes to mind to justify the 
Brazilian diplomatic contradiction is that, to the contrary of the WTO law, the 
Mercosur law did not offer a proper consideration to the environmental 
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problematique. This is the hypothesis this paper intends to verify, always limited 
and driven by these two retreated tires cases. 
 Driven by such an attempt, the first chapter discusses the environmental 
factor within the international economic scenario, especially in the context of Free 
Trade Agreements. After this theoretical introduction, in the two following chapters 
the retreated tires case will be presented, exposing the allegations of Uruguay and 
the European Union with the respective Brazilian responses. Finally, the disclosure 
of the Mercosur treatment on the environment, which will eventually pave the way 








































The world greeted the last decade of our era´s second millennium and 
simultaneously an emerging triumphant economic approach. The visualization of 
this reality remains clear in the powerful symbolism boasted by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall; just a few weeks before the dawn of the 1990´s. This episode can always be 
recalled to demonstrate the overwhelming mightiness of free trade and the 
promises it may have provided to the spirit of those who stepped into that new 
decade. In fact, however, the economic promises of the Margareth Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan reactionary model had actually other policy companions. 
In the same year of the formal German Reunification, the United States of 
America, the very bastion of free trade, embargoed the import of yellowfin tuna 
from Mexico alleging to be driven by environmental concerns. Mexican boats in the 
eastern tropical Pacific were not, they said, following the requirements of the U.S. 
Marine Mammal Protection Act on dolphin-protective fishing practices and, as a 
result, should not have their environmentally unfriendly products bought.  
The case was brought to the former GATT´s Dispute Settlement in the 
following year, having the American measures been decided to be contrary to the 
GATT law for one country should not embargo foreign products solely because the 
country of origin does not follow the domestic politics of the import country (the 
extra-territoriality issue), being allowed only to make such an embargo based on 
the quality or content of the product (the product versus process issue)1. As 
brought under GATT, this unsuccessful American tentative of imposing an 
environmentally sound fishing process to a developing country eventually became 
                                                 
1
 http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/envir_e/edis04_e.htm (27 May 2007) 
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the cause célèbre on the issue in analyzes owing to the fact that it is generally 
recognized as the very launcher of the modern trade-environment debate2. 
 
 
I. The Trade and Environment Nexus: A Convergence and 
Conflict Debate 
 
The range of matters that oppose environmentalists and free trade 
advocates trigger more than a mere democratic antagonism but rather a severe 
hostility that not rarely brings to light war-like posture and acts. More than 
divergent punctual ideas, the gap between the two groups give place to a clash of 
opposing Weltanschauungen, which some scholars dare say to actually reach a 
real cultural scale3. But what is behind this hostility?  
The raison d´être of whatever policy is to reach the concretization of a 
deemed positive outcome. In this sense, there may be (and usually there is) 
controversies on both the value given to this goal (whether it is beneficial or not) 
and/or on how this policy intends to produce such a result (whether the end justify 
the means not only on a ethical basis but also on a pragmatic one). In this token, 
one can perceive the seeds of the trade-environment discord at once by realizing 
that if, on one hand, the environmental discourse gravitates over preservation; on 
the other, at the core of the free-trade speech prevails change, or  “development”. 
That is, the environmental position states the importance of the environment, 
whose preservation more than frequently implies the regulation, i.e. restriction, of 
trade´s impetus; while the free trade position stresses the role of trade 
liberalization on the promotion of economic welfare: this continuous improvement 
is jeopardized virtually in the same degree with which trade is restricted4. In this 
wise, one could affirm that not only the means but the very goal of these two 
policies make up a clash, for their concept of environmental “improvement” is 
contradictory.  But beyond such a superficial analyzes, it remains the uncertainty 
                                                 
2
 Chris Wold, Sanford Gaines, & Greg Block, Trade and the environment: law and policy (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2005), pg.4. e Boyle 740 
3
 John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?. In Trade and the 
Enviroment – Law, Economics, and policy, edited by Durwood Zaelke, Paul Orbuch and Robert F. Housman, 
pg. 220. Washington D.C: Island Press, 1993. 
4
 Idem, p. 219. 
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of whether these two policies and worldviews are de facto intrinsically and always 
divergent. 
The civil society, environmentalists, economists and scholars in general are 
still gulping in the quarrel that tries to answer the question of the nature of the 
trade-environment relation. The range of opinions varies by large. While 
searching his own position on this debate, Professor Wold interestingly refers to 
two very opposing ideas that denounce the range of the scrutiny5. Assuming the 
importance of environmental concerns, some ardent critics of free trade, for 
example, claim that there is a 
 
[…] systematic pattern of WTO attacks on member nations´ vital environmental 
concerns and policy priorities, and the biases built into WTO rules that promote 
unsustainable uses of natural resources. Over its almost nine years of operation, the 
WTO´s anti-environmental rhetoric has been replaced by more politic 
pronouncements even as it has systematically ruled against every domestic 
environmental policy that has been challenged and eviscerated exceptions that might 
have been used to safeguard such laws. Instead of seeking to resolve conflicts 
between commercial and environmental goals, the WTO´s largely ineffectual 
Committee on Trade and the Environment has become a venue mainly for identifying 




 Some free trade advocates also stand before the critics claiming the 
opposite, v.g.: 
 
There is no inherent conflict between high labor and environmental standards in the 
domestic economy and success in the global economy. In fact, the evidence points 
strongly to a positive correlation between high standards, high national incomes, and 
economic openness. Nations that have opened themselves to the global economy tend 
to grow faster, achieve higher per capita incomes, and maintain higher labor and 
                                                 
5
 Chris Wold, op. cit., pg.5 
6
 Lori Wallach & Patrick Woodall, Whose Trade Organization? The Comprehensive Guide to the WTO . 
New Press, 2003. 
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environmental standards. The belief that higher standards can be promoted only 




Naturally, the debate is actually more intricate than these extreme ideas 
may make one ever suppose. Although to provide any substantial contribution 
thereto is beyond the aims of this paper, the relevance thereof as a theoretical 
basis to the study in analyzes rests beyond doubt and this need to shed light on 
the relation trade-environment will inevitably lead to a deeper immersion on the 
question posed. 
 
I. a) The Trade-Environment Nexus Before 1990 
  
 By the moment of its very outset, the trade-environment question first arose 
with a contour rather different from that one emerged together with the 1990´s and 
so far generally known today. Reduced solely to the commercial perspective and 
fueled by, inter alia, the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the matter appeared in the 
first half of the 1970´s virtually limited to the problems of market access and 
competitive effects, which respectively refer to product and process standards.  
The concern of the international community for their economic 
competitiveness before the global market always led to certain apprehensiveness 
towards process standards. They fear that by setting higher standards of 
environmental control on the production processes of their commodities, a 
depreciation of their exchange rate would come as a result due to the consequent 
imposition of additional costs on their domestic economies. Although studies 
indicated that such effect remains irrelevant, to this competitiveness effect it was 
formulated two equally theoretical answers8. First, conducting Ricardo´s 
comparative advantage theory into the reflection, it was argued that process 
standards are positive inasmuch they would reflect countries´ different 
environmental conjunctures, which must be taken into account in order to avoid 
                                                 
7
 Daniel T. Griswold, Trade, Labor, and the Environment: How Blue and Green Sanctions Threaten Higher 
Standards, Cato Institute Trade Policy Analysis No. 15, Aug. 2, 2001, at10. 
8
 Charles S. Pearson. The Trade and Environment Nexus: What is New Since ´72? , In Trade and the 
Enviroment – Law, Economics, and policy, edited by Durwood Zaelke, Paul Orbuch and Robert F. Housman, 
p.24. Washington D.C: Island Press, 1993. 
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trade distortions. In other words, the different demands and supplies of 
environmental resources should compose the market equation just like labor does, 
avoiding economic inefficiencies. The second answer follows a similar logic 
affirming that, before stricter process standards, the general competitive position of 
a country will be maintained, for it would lead to a boost on environmentally friendly 
export industries. Naturally, however, positive effects grounded on the adjustment 
to economical reality must not involve governmental subsidies, meaning that the 
Polluter Pays Principle must be followed9. 
The problem of environmental product standards is intimately related to the 
matter of market access since these measures are highly efficient on imposing a 
disguised restriction to trade under the “politically correct” green flag10. Besides, 
the matter also carries the same nature of health or sanitary standards. For all that, 
product standards have been given wide attention, culminating in a variety of 
proposed standards for international adoption. The Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, NAFTA, EU, OECD, WTO, etc., all have regulated the matter. Under 
the WTO, product standards must obey the general conditions of the general 
agreement (e.g. non-discrimination and national treatment), and, furthermore, the 
dispositions adopted under the Tokyo Round´s Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (Standards Code), which requires members countries to adopt standards 
developed by multilateral organizations and states that they must not constitute an 
“unnecessary obstacle to international trade”. The TBT Agreement has a broad 
scope and played a decisive role on environmental-related disputes settlements 
under the World Trade Organization, including the EC-Asbestos and EC-
Sardines11. 
 
I. b) The Trade/Environment Nexus: 1990 onwards 
 
 The debate was renewed in the early 1990´s by force of a combination of 
factors. Since the 1970´s oil crisis, the world economy was challenged, lately 
                                                 
9
 Idem, p.25. 
10
 BHALA, Raj; KENNEDY, Kevin. World trade law. Charlottesville: Lexis Law, 1998, pp. 123-125. 
11
Chris Wold, Sanford Gaines, & Greg Block, Trade and the environment: law and policy (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2005), pg..370. 
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resulting, with the consequent 1980´s crisis, in the fall of development-oriented 
dictatorial regimes in developing countries and on substantial changes of 
developed countries´ economic orientation. Likewise, the so-called third, second 
and even the first world, especially those who adopted the welfare-state model, felt 
a need for opening their economies. The neo-conservative economic wave 
resulted, inter alia, on the integration of national economies processes. The result 
of these processes was naturally the enhancement or even resurgence of the 
trade-environment problem, for the integration of economies emphasized the 
problem of divergent environmental policies. 
 Although important, the economic stimulus did not come alone, but rather 
was accompanied of a genuine environmental one. Moving far beyond the scope of 
the Trail Smelter case, that is, short-distance transboundary pollution, by around 
the year 1990, the countries of the world had been coming always closer to deal 
with environmental problems of global scope. With this concern, it was signed, 
among other texts, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. By that time, the international progress and awareness led to a real 
“globalization of environmental problems”12. 
 In this wise, to some extent, the world saw a certain shift of view; and the 
trade-environment issues started to be seen also from an environmental 
perspective. The very notion of sustainable development is an expression of that.  
Since then, the study of the effects of free trade on the environment and the use of 
commercial measures to improve environmental conditions became widespread. 
Put it simply, the discussion now also addresses the “scale and composition 
effects” and the “regulatory effect”13.  
Environmentalists claim that the growth of the commerce stresses the 
environment inasmuch it implies in increasing consumption of environmental 
resources due to both higher output and input productions. Even worst, unfettered 
trade would nullify several environmental rules. Defending the environmentally 
soundness of free trade and therefore advocating against the trade-environment 
                                                 
12
 Charles S. Pearson, op. cit., p.29. 
13
Chris Wold, op. cit., pg.5. 
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conflict, it is also said that economic growth changes the preferences of those 
affected thereby resulting on stronger environmental claims and consequent 
protection. Moreover, free trade advocates also state that trade restrictions “are a 
second-best approach to international environmental problems” and inflict poverty 
and environmental degradation on developing countries14. Free trade agreements 
would result furthermore on the elimination of environmentally harmful subsidies 
and easily result on exchange of pollution control technologies. 
To sum up, there are indeed traits of incompatibility between trade and 
environment, especially from a first and superficial sight. But there are also clear 
evidences that commercial and environmental policies are plainly congruent. What 
really lacks is a proper harmonization of the two policies. But, given that, how have 
international organizations dealt with the theme? What have been the answers 
they found to this dilemma? It leads to the study of the harmonization of 
environmental rules. 
 
II - Environmental Harmonization Within International Fora 
 
a) The WTO 
 
The World Trade Organization regulates trade restrictions and distortions 
and is based on three basic disciplines: most-favored-nation; national treatment; 
and non-protection. This international organization, which will be central to the 
Chapter 3, has a leading role on the free trade context and, as a natural result, a 
highly important role on the development of the trade-environment debate. Object 
of much criticism by part of the society and some academic literature15, the WTO 
has decided a few primordial disputes on the present matter, including those that 
first called general attention to the problematic relation between trade and 
environment, as one can notes from the foreword to this Chapter. These rules 
include, inter alios, (a) The Gasoline Case, (b) The Shrimp/Turtle Case (The 
Tuna/Dolphin Case), (c) The Asbestos Case, (d) The Hormones Case and (e) The 
Australian Salmon Case.  
                                                 
14
 Idem, p.6. 
15
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization#Criticism_3 (27 May 2007) 
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However, prior to its settlements, we have the dispositions of its 
agreements. As a matter of fact, the WTO recognizes the environmental matter yet 
in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. Initially, however, no explicit call for 
harmonization was made, although its rules inevitably led to an approximation of 
national regulations. As these first disciplines were considered weak to solve the 
problem, during the Tokyo Round some parties adopted the GATT Standards 
Code on technical barriers to trade. This text requires the parties to ensure their 
standards donnot impose “unnecessary obstacles” to international trade and 
encourages the adoption of international standards created by international 
organisms. The mechanism was later developed in the Uruguay Round when the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Code was adopted.  
The GATT´s Art. XX, however, is a disposition that lies at the core of the 
environmental harmonization issue. This Article exempt environmental measures 
of the free trade provisions to the extent that these same measures are proven to 
be really designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health; that the measure 
is necessary to fulfill the claimed policy objective, which includes the need to prove 
that there is no less restrictive measure available (cf. Art.XX(b)); or that the 
measure is related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and that it 
is applied in conjunction with equivalent restrictions on the domestic production 
and consumption (cf. Art.XX(g)). It is important to note that these restrictions to the 
national production and consumption mean not only that the same measures must 
apply domestically, but also that foreign and national industries must posses the 
same range of options, which implies the need of impartiality when setting the 
measure16. Fulfilling these requisites, the member state that has its measures 
challenged before the Dispute Settlement Mechanism must also prove that the 
measure is not applied in a manner that constitutes an “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or a 
“disguised restriction to international trade” (cf. Art. XX Chapeau). It is decisive that 
the country intending to make use of an environmental measure negotiates with 
the parties involved, especially when the later is a developing country17. This need 
                                                 
16
 VARELLA, M. D. Direito internacional econômico ambiental. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2004. v. 1., p. 266 
17
 Idem, 269. 
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was particularly highlighted, having a decisive role, in the United States — Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. 
 
b) Regional Free Trade Agreements 
 
The formation of regional free trade blocs is both a fundamental step to the 
trade flow in the globalized world today and a not less important tool for the 
concerted efforts of environmental protection18. This contradiction shows, once 
again, the intimacy of the trade-environment relation and offers more examples of 
the harmonization policy.   
The treatment given to the environment by the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur), a Regional Trade Agreement that composes the scenario of the next 
Chapter to this paper, is still object of much fewer studies. The environmental 
concerns of this RTA will be more extensively studied on the Chapter 4, but a brief 
introduction is hereby pertinent. Its environmental concerns are first noted in the 
Preamble to the 1991 Asuncion Treaty. After emphasizing that freeing the regional 
trade “constitutes a fundamental condition” to economic development, the parties 
affirm that this development must occur with a due “equilibrium”, exploiting 
efficiently the natural resources and protecting the environment. In the same year 
of this treaty´s signature, the Common Market Council (CMC) Resolution 03/91 
addressed the need to include the environmental cause on Sectorial Agreements. 
However, the deemed Mercosur´s first document on the environment, was the 
Canela Declaration, which interestingly ended up to be important for the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development be based in Brazil19. 
It was on 1992, however, that not only the meeting in Las Leñas, Argentina, 
included in its goals environmental matters, but that it was established the Special 
Meetings on the Environment (REMA), which were intended to study the member 
countries´ environmental legislations and propose recommendations to the 
Common Market Group (GMC), the executive branche of Mercosur.  One of these 
                                                 
18
 Michelot, Agnès. Environnement et Commerce. Genève, Suisse: UNITAR, 2003, p. 113. 
19
 Lopes, Fernando Augusto Montai y; Belincanta, Fernando César. Estudo da Evolução do Tratamento 
Ambiental no Mercosul: do Tratado de Assunção até o Acordo Quadro sobre Meio Ambiente. Jus Navigandi, 
Teresina, ano 6, n. 59, out. 2002.  
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recommendations was the text “Basic Orientations on an Environmental Policy” 
that would eventually become the proposed Additional Protocol on the 
Environment. The REMA later became a definitive body responsible for the 
environment within Mercosur – the Subgroup Nº6 – and the Protocol on the 
environment was rejected. In its place, the parties adopted the less ambitious 
Mercosur Framework Agreement on the Environment (Florianopolis Agreement) in 
2001. There have been some efforts of adjustment of standards, but still, the most 
important is that, similarly to the WTO, the Mercosur boasts an article providing an 
environmental exception to the free trade provisions – the Article 50 to the 1980 
Montevideo Treaty, which has inclusive be applied on a recent Mercosur´s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms in the retreated tires case opposing Uruguay and 
Argentina, which will also eventually be studied more extensively due to its crucial 
role. 
Naturally, a different system is to be found in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement – NAFTA. Here, one can perceive a more environmentally sensitive 
institution20. The North American RTA also calls its three members to adopt 
international standards, yet it goes a step further by also precluding downward 
harmonization and exhort them not to “waive or otherwise derogate” security 
measures (including environmental) in order to encourage investment21. However, 
the requirements set under WTO to environmental standards have no similar within 
the NAFTA. An important shift from the last examined system rests in the burden of 
proof. Before NAFTA, the later lies on the complaining party and not on the 
defendant who keeps the environmental measure. Moreover, NAFTA also works 
based on the OECD´s Polluter Pays Principle and the need of set standards 
according to scientific methods. 
Within the European Union, standardization is seen as a promoter of the 
Lisbon Strategy, which involves the goal of this RTA of becoming “the most 
competitive single market”22. The EU has been enacting rules on environmental 
policy extensively, resulting even in conflicting rules23. The Treaty of Rome boasts 
                                                 
20
 John H, Jackson,  op. cit., p. 277. 
21
 www.ftaa-alca.org/wgroups/wgin/english/fta_3c2e.asp (27 May 2007) 
22
 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/standardisation/index_en.htm (27 May 2007) 
23
John H, Jackson,  op. cit., p. 275. 
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a whole chapter on harmonization of rules, in a system that calls its members to 
maintain “high” levels of environmental guardianship.  In fact, the harmonization of 
environmental standards is a explicit objective to the EU – to the contrary of 
NAFTA, for instance24, and, together with the substantial developmental 
assistance to its poorer members, is part of the efforts of providing a “level playing 
field” for economic competition within the bloc25. Within the EU system, the 
member states are free to adopt and maintain their own standards whenever the 
issue is not regulated by the Council of Ministers, who, by a qualified majority, has 
the competency to legislate on internal market standards26. However, in adopting 
higher standards, the member state may keep track of the limits imposed on Article 
36 of the Treaty of Rome. This disposition is based on GATT´s Article XX, yet with 
a narrower scope, and prohibit the environmental standards to be actually used in 
such a manner that would a) constitute an arbitrary discrimination, b) have 
negative effects disproportionate to its objectives, c) do not be necessary to 
achieve its goals and d) donnot use the less restrictive means of reaching its 
objectives. Thus, prevails the rule that the powers not exercised by the EC remains 
to member countries, which must mutually recognize other member´s standards 
unless they run counter the common dispositions, particularly Art. 30 and 36 of the 
mentioned agreement. 
  
c) International Dispute Settlement 
 
As it could be seen, the balance between the trade and the environment is 
not made by the International Organization´s legal texts alone. As there frequently 
are controversies over how to apply them to a concrete case, the member 
countries open the proceedings for the establishment of the IO´s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms whenever they feel economically harmed by the other 
member´s acts. In so doing, the decision emanated by the competent organs 
                                                 
24
 Chris Wold, Sanford Gaines, & Greg Block, Trade and the environment: law and policy (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2005),  pg. 841. 
25
 Idem, 843. 
26
 John H, Jackson,  op. cit., p.  275. 
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inevitably help to shape the legal texts solution found to the trade-environment 
dilemma. 
Our study focuses on some of these international disputes. Firstly, it will be 
analyzed a dispute between Uruguay and Brazil within Mercosur (Chapter 2), 
following this, a dispute between Brazil and the EC before the WTO (Chapter 3), 
and, more concisely, a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay also in Mercosur 
(Chapter 4). All these cases relate to the same issue: import embargo of retreated 
tires.  
Although the trade-environment question was somehow overlooked in the 
first case, and this is part of the problem that motivated this paper, the other two 
disputes provide a clear picture of the theoretical background discussed throughout 
this Chapter. In the WTO, for instance, the EC denies that the Brazilian import ban 
was motivated by environmental concerns, affirming that it is a mere disguised 
protectionist measure thus serving solely economic purposes. If, however, the EC 
also denies that waste tires are environmentally problematic, the Uruguay 
recognizes an environmental problem associated with this waste but nevertheless 
successfully refutes the Argentinean claims that their import ban was 
environmentally necessary. But given the scale and composition effect on the 
environment that the import of retreated tires allegedly has, could it be that one 
country totally block its market access to this product on an environmental basis? 











The Retreated Tires Case Before the Mercosur 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Overlooking 
the Environmental Factor 
 
 Chapter Two  
 
 
I - The waste tires problem  
 
Although not really considered hazardous wastes, its durability and production 
volume make used tires lie among the largest and most problematic sort of wastes 
present in the world today. Their carcasses contribute for the propagation of 
several diseases, e.g. West Nilo Virus, encephalitis, dengue fever, and hanta 
virus27, for they are convenient breeding grounds for mosquitos and rodents. This 
problem is made worst by the attractiveness this trash may have to children, who 
can also be easily injured playing among them28. Furthermore, tires contain high 
combustible and pollutant materials and whenever burnt, tires liberate large 
amounts of toxic air pollution, oil, and heavy metals. But at the core of the whole 
problem is the indeterminate existence that this good actually has. Since they are 
specially produced to be robust and durable, tires, once thrown apart, let these 
difficulties last for virtually forever.  
The negative idiosyncrasies of this waste are such that municipal trash 
haulers seldom accept them and the special dumps where used tires are usually 
kept frequently undergo legal antagonisms with municipal authorities29. As a result, 
they are easily thrown in landfills or illegally disposed all around thus enhancing the 
safety and health concerns they by themselves generate30.  
The necessity to cease with all these long-term complications turned out 
leading to the definitive need to make used tires somehow reusable. As a result, 
                                                 
27




 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tire#Other_use_and_recycling (27 May 2007) 
30
 Tire Reuse and Recycling: Guide to Used Tire Recycling Options in the Los Angeles Area. Available at: 
http://www.lacity.org/san/docs/tire-reuse-brochure.pdf (27 May 2007) 
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tires became one of the most reused sorts of trashes. Demonstrating this, if in 
1989 only 10 percent of the more than 250 million tires the United States discards 
a year were recycled or reused, now more than 80 percent account as being so31. 
Recycled tires are used to manufacture several new other products such as 
playgrounds and aesthetic mats, floor tile, carpet underlayment and rubber-
modified asphalt pavements. Some companies also accept used tires to have it as 
combustion fuel – used in the place of coal. Moreover, researches continue and 
keep exploring innovative ways to solve the used tires problems. New technologies 
include, for instance, grind the tires up and place the rubber bits beneath golf 
course greens32 or the use of truck tires for low-coast, easy-to-install culverts33.  
However, the costs and deficiencies of every solution ever found are evident. 
The burn of used tires for energetic purposes (averagely a tire has the energy of 
9.4 Liters of oil), for instance, is a peculiarly dangerous process yet and, in Brazil, 
must be done under strict supervision of authorities. But the most pertinent 
problem of reusing this waste lies in the matter of retreated tires. These are tires 
used before but that underwent a process of reformation by means of applying new 
rubber in the carcasses. That is, as, for safety reasons, new tires cannot be made 
entirely of old ones (new tires must be manufactured primarily from virgin rubber – 
recycled rubber can thus only account for 5 to 15 percent of the finished product34), 
the carcasses of used tires are reformed to extend its trend life35. The result is the 
reformed tire, whose worn tread is replaced of new material, i.e. about 30 percent 
of new material is added to the carcasses36. As soon as the effects of such a 
palliative measure are over, the carcasses become the same problematic trash 
once again.  
It must be said, however, that this problematic view of the waste tires is not 
uncontroversial. Although it appears to be the mainstream position, some are of 
the view that this sort of waste is not necessarily environmentally problematic. The 
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 A development of the UW-Madison University: 
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Brazilian federal deputy Ivo José (PT-MG), for instance, argues in line with the 
European Communities.  He affirms that the import of tires´ carcasses does not 
imply on environmental harm because the tires retreating Brazilian industry can 
properly manage these wastes37. 
 
II - The Brazilian trade policy restrictions: triggering an 
international conflict 
 
In 2002, Brazil produced 41 million new tires, 45 million in 2003 and 53 million 
in 200438. It discards approximately 35 million per year39, but it is by no means 
possible to give them the proper destination40 - in 2003, 22 million of tires were 
collected and had a proper treatment41. Brazil has a developed environmental 
regulatory system42, but as far as the problem of tires is concerned, just like in the 
whole world, it serves only to guarantee the best treatment available, for 
unfortunately it still lacks effectively appropriate solutions43. That is the 
environmental advocates point of view. 
However, on the other hand, it must be noted that Brazil retreats 15 million of 
tires per year. Thus, as far as this activity is considered, if the United States holds 
the first position in the economy of the world, Brazil holds the second44. Being 
eminently a highly lucrative business, although prohibited of doing so, due to a 
matter of legal interpretation, Brazilian retreaders import cheap foreign used tires 
by virtue of interim relief adopted by Brazilian courts.  In this wise, after the import 
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 24 
ban on retreated tires, the import of used tires from the EC, for example, 
dramatically increased from about 10 million per year to more than 70 million of 
tires per year45. Considering all that, and literal references to protect the tire 
retreating national industry during the parliamentary discussions that led to the 
adoption of the import ban, one gets the trade picture.  
Driven by the environmental or commercial motivations explained above, or 
probably concurrently by both, Brazil adopts a variety of laws. Some have an 
uncontestable environmental purpose, others, such as the very retreated tires 
import ban, may actually hide commercial motives.  
The Brazilian legislation on tires is rather abundant. On May 13, 1991, the 
Brazilian Secretariat of Foreign Trade (SECEX), via Portaria No. 8 (hereinafter 
Portaria No. 8/91), prohibited the import of used goods, including tires. Five years 
later a Resolution adopted by the Brazilian National Environment Council 
(CONAMA) that regulated the import and use of hazardous materials, prohibited 
the import of several solid wastes, used tires included (cf. Resolution No. 23/96)46. 
It was followed by the Resolution 258 of August 26, 1999, which set the 
responsibility of collection and final disposal of irreversible tires dispersed all over 
the national territory by their importers and producers – it would be done according 
to the proportion of tires imported and produced respectively. Later, in 2001, the 
Decree 3179, which set the environmental crimes, was emended by the Federal 
Executive´s Decree 3919, adding an Article that establishes a fine for the import of 
used or retreated tires (400 BRL per unit) and prohibits the commerce, transport or 
keeping of used or retreated imported tires. Finally, by September 19, international 
trade managers were already informed that the import of remolded tires implied on 
a previous license and on September 25, 2000 CESEX adopts the Portaria No. 8 
(hereinafter Portaria 8/00). Being the eminent target of the eventual challenge 
imposed by Uruguay under Mercosur dispute settlement mechanisms, the Portaria 
8/00 imposes an import ban on used and retreated tires (classified under the codes 
4012.20 and 4012.10 of the Combined Nomenclature, respectively). 
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46
 www.pt.org.br/assessor/NTpneusUsados.doc and 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/revista/Rev_79/pareceres/nota_pneus_RGS.pdf (27 May 2007) 
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III - A Brief Introduction to Mercosur´s Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms 
 
The functioning of the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the Southern 
Common market underwent four different phases directly related to the dispositions 
of Mercosur´s primary agreements: a) Assuncion Treaty; b) Brasilia Protocol; c) 
Ouro Preto Protocol; and d) Olivos Protocol47.  
The 1991 Assuncion Treaty founded Mercosur, consolidating six years of 
works on its creation, which formally started in 1985 with the Foz do Iguazu 
Declaration.  In the Annex III to this treaty, the parts agreed on the need to develop 
a Dispute Settlement Mechanism and therefore established a temporary one. 
Shaping the first phase, this system to settle disputes arisen of the application of 
Mercosur law stated that the dispute should first be object of a direct negotiation. If 
the parties failed to find a solution, the matter would be brought to the Grupo 
Mercado Comum (GMC) which would have 60 days to present a settlement. If the 
GMC did not find this solution, the Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC) would 
come to life in order to find one48. 
A few months later, the Brasilia Protocol was signed, reshaping the 
mechanism. Initially, it was also to be temporary but ended up becoming 
permanent49, solely eventually undergoing some minor changes, mostly set by the 
2002 Olivos Protocol. 
The Brasilia Protocol delimited the issues that could be object of controversy 
and established the right of individuals to initiate the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms (cf. Chapter V). Under this text, these mechanisms are three: a) direct 
negotiations, b) GMC intervention and c) Arbitral Proceedings. That is, if the parties 
donnot reach a solution negotiating the matter alone, any of them can submit the 
matter for the GMC consideration, which will present a solution, and if whatever 
party disagree with this proposition, the matter can finally be brought to the Arbitral 
Proceedings (cf. 7, § 1).  The Tribunal will then have 60 days to decide, being 
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possible to prorogate for more 30 days by a request of the President (cf. Art.20)50. 
This is exactly the procedure we will find in the analyzes of the case presented in 
this Chapter. 
The 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol comes merely to introduce an additional 
proceeding in which the reclamation is submitted to the Commerce Commission - 
CC. This procedure, however, does not nullify the Brasilia Protocol process and its 
scope is limited by the issues of CC competency51. 
Finally, the 2002 Olivos Protocol on the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
(Protocolo de Olivos para la Solución de Controversias) regulates the prior 
arrangement set by the Brasilia protocol with more details, therefore 
institutionalizing it as it works today. It is important to note that the system set 
under the Brasilia Protocol remains; as a result, it continues to lack a supranational 
body. However, although the three phases remain, it was added a second stage. 
That is, the party that does not accept the decision of the ad hoc Tribunal can 
appeal to the Mercosur Permanent Appealing Tribunal (Tribunal Permanente de 
Revisión del Mercosur). 
 In spite of the changes, the case involving Brazil and Uruguay initiated before 
the signature of the Olivos Protocol and followed just the three steps set by the 
provisions of the Brasilia Protocol. The case ended with the ad hoc arbitration. On 
the other hand, on the tires dispute involving Argentina and Uruguay, it is possible 
to see the performance of the Permanent Appealing Tribunal (cf. Chapter 4). 
 
IV - The Dispute´s Procedural Background 
 
As the legal measures adopted by Brazil ran counter economic interests of 
Uruguay, an exporter of reformed tires, some months after the promulgation of 
Portaria No. 8/00, on March 12, 2001, Uruguay requested to Brazil, via Note No. 
538/2001, the start of direct negotiations to solve the so established commercial 
divergence (Articles 2 and 3, Brasilia Protocol). 
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The direct negotiations between Brazil and Uruguay were then conducted on 
April 23, in Assuncion, Paraguay. With only a few minutes of extent, the meeting 
results in no agreement. Uruguay then notifies Brazil of its decision to consider the 
negotiations phase terminated and by the end of May asks the Pro Tempore 
Presidency to add the tires controversy on the GMC agenda. 
The GMC intervention phase took place on June 12 and 13, 2001, during the 
XLII Ordinary Meeting of this organ, held again in the Paraguayan capital, 
Assuncion. The matter also was taken to the GMC XXI Extraordinary Meeting, held 
in Montevideu on July 13 of the same year. In neither occasion an agreement was 
ever reached. The intervention phase was then finished to give place to the 
arbitration proceedings. 
On august 27 the Administrative Secretariat (SAM) was notified by Uruguay of 
its decision to start the arbitration phase (Brasilia Protocol, Chapter IV). After the 
due notification of Brazil, the TAHM (Tribunal Ad Hoc del Mercosur) was 
established on September 17 and had its first administrative meeting on October 
12, when it adopts its working rules. The arbiters designated were Raul Emilio 
Vinuesa of Argentina (the Tribunal President), Maristela Basso of Brazil and 
Ronald Herbert of Uruguay. Enrique Augusto Gabriel represented Brazil in court, 
while Uruguay was represented by Jose Maria Robaina. Several assessors 
supported both representatives52. 
The Tribunal called the parties for an Audience to be held on December 3. 
The parties, however, asked for a suspension on the proceedings and the 
Audience only occurred on December 18, in the SAM building, Montevideu. Orally, 
the parties presented their positions and provided information demanded by the 
Tribunal. Finally, a written resume of each party allegation was submitted to the 
Tribunal. On December 28, the latter asked to the parties a prorogation of the 
deadline and the parties conceded it. Therefore, it is only by January 9 that the 
TAHM provided its decision on the mater53. 
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V - The Uruguay Allegation 
 
 
Uruguay states that the controversy rests on the Portaria No. 8/00 and all the 
related instruments that directly or indirectly contribute to the import barrier set to 
retreated tires classified in the position 4012 of the Common Nomenclature. It 
affirmed that Brazil banned the import of used tires (classified in the NCM 
subposition 4012.20) with the Portaria No. 8/91, but that the challenged text, the 
Portaria of 2000, extended the same prohibition to retreated tires (classified in the 
NCM subposition 4012.10). According to Uruguay, between the whole period of 
time that separate these two Portarias, its companies exported reformed tires to 
Brazil in a frequent basis. Likewise, it concludes, the Portaria No.8/00 illegally 
frustrated this commercial movement running against several Mercosur 
dispositions, especially the Assuncion Treaty, CMC Decision No. 22/00 and 
international law principles. 
Uruguay emphasizes that the frequent export of retreated tires (4012.10) to 
Brazil during almost a decade is strong evidence that during such a period only the 
import of used tires (NCM 4012.20) was forbidden, while, per contra, the import of 
retreated tires was legally allowed. That is, the reference made by the Portaria No. 
8/91 to “used” goods actually did not encompass retreated tires, as Brazil seemed 
to be trying to allege. Furthermore, Uruguay proves that from 1991 to 2000 several 
Brazilian authorities formally admitted that remolded tires were allowed to enter 
into Brazilian territory, including the Receita Federal, which clearly differentiates 
the conditions of tires under the NCM 4012.20 and 4012.10 subpositions. In 1995, 
for instance, answering a Paraguay consult, the Ministry of Industry, Commerce 
and Tourism of Brazil affirmed that the import of reformed tires was not subject to 
any legal or administrative restrictions. Uruguay states that Brazil answered in the 
same sense to others consults, such as the No. 32/98, letting it clear the position 
the Brazilian government, and consequently Portaria No. 8/91, had towards the 
import of retreated tires, i.e. they were accepted and were therefore not strictly 
considered “used” goods. Even the CONAMA Resolution 258/99, in its end-of-life 
tires destruction and recycling program, admitted the import of the reformed tires 
and, besides, in its Resolution 23/96 the same environmental agency makes clear 
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distinction between used and reformed tires and their respective environmental 
and import treatment54. 
In this wise, in other words, Uruguay looked forward proving that Portaria No. 
8/91 reference to “used goods” did not encompass remolded tires, and that Brazil 
as a whole was aware of this reality and also that, as a result, the Portaria No. 8/00 
comes to apply a new and illegal commercial measure that runs against the 
provisions that regulate market access within Mercosur (cf. Decision 22/00). 
With the attempt to frustrate any other defense coming from Brazil, Uruguay 
also declares that used and reformed tires are clearly discernible in the NCM 
classification and that consequently Brazil could not affirm that the NCM refers only 
to “used” and “new” tires because while the position 4011 refers to “new”, the 
position 4012 is subdivided, making the distinction between retreated (4012.10) 
and “used” tires (4012.20). Brazil could neither, Uruguay continues, make any 
allegation claiming the liberty states have to determine what encompass “new” and 
“used”, for this freedom cannot undermine technique rules, the NCM or the good-
reasoning. Moreover, defend itself on the basis of environmental policy would not 
be possible too because it would not be sound with the mere interpretative nature 
Brazil had been giving to the problem and, furthermore, the CONAMA Resolution 
No. 258/99 would also run counter such an approach. 
Uruguay also looks forward safeguarding a broad extent to the dispute. It 
mentions that the controversy cannot be limited to the Portaria No. 8/00, for several 
other legal instruments have similar effect and are also in conflict with the 
compromises assumed under Mercosur. In this sense, as an example, it is named 
the Decree No. 3010 that impose special fines on imported reformed tires and also 
INMETRO Portaria No. 123 that establish new technical exigencies to tires 
reformed abroad – but letting those reformed in Brazil apart of these additional 
requirements. 
The argumentation of Uruguay is concluded when it points out what 
dispositions of Mercosur were not observed. In this sense, it is cited the Decision 
No. 22, also adopted in 2000, but even though before Portaria No. 8/00, for it sets 
the prohibition on Mercosur Members on adopting any restrictive measures to their 
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reciprocal trade flow. Uruguay recognizes, however, that this prohibition is limited 
by the disposed in the Assuncion Treaty Article 2 (b), which refers to the 1980 
Montevideu Treaty´s Article 50. Uruguay is of the view that these exceptions, 
however, are not applicable to the present case and affirms conclusively that Brazil 
never contested this fact. The same measures, according to Uruguay, also violated 
Art. 1 of the Assuncion Treaty, and Art.1 and 10 (2) of its Annex I. 
Finally, the attitude of Brazil would also have ran against principles of 
international law, namely the “pacta sunt servanda” and “goodd faith” (Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Art. 18, 26, 33.1), which, as states 
Uruguay, become even more relevant within the context of an international 
integration bloc such as Mercosur. Another principle Brazil would have not 
observed is the estoppel – venire contra factum proprium – (Art. 45, Vienna 
Convention) due to the inconsistency of the Brazilian trade policy measures with its 
prior allegations and attitude. 
To sum up, Uruguay´s allegation is mostly based on the abrupt adverse effect 
Brazilian measures imposed on the trade flow of retreated tires and the prohibition 
of so doing established especially via Decision CMC No. 22/00. It also make 
reference to a possible environmental defense that it, in advance, classifies as 
unacceptable given the interpretative defense Brazil presents since the beginning. 
 
 
VI - The Brazilian Defense 
 
Brazil first manifests contrary to the broad approach of the challenge inflicted 
by Uruguay. Brazil is of the view that this not only works against its right to offer a 
proper defense, but other legal instruments than Portaria No. 8/00 were not 
mentioned before in the process and it would not be according to Mercosur law to 
enlarge the object of controversy in that late in the arbitration. 
Also trying to make of Portaria No. 8/00 the unique point at stake, Brazil 
affirms that the Decree No. 3919/01 and the INMETRO Portaria No. 133/01 were 
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adopted by different organisms regulating the environment and consumers 
protection and thus could not be classified as measures modifying Portaria No. 
8/00, as does uruguay. 
Additionally, Brazil denounces the Uruguay´s misuse of the prior phases of 
the dispute settlement. Indeed, the negotiations held on April 23 were finished only 
15 Minutes after its start because of the Uruguay insistence. Moreover Uruguay did 
not let it clear what the controversy was about. Brazil asserts that always sought to 
solve the controversy but Uruguay seemed to never share the will to such an 
attempt55. 
Concentrating its efforts in the Portaria No. 8/00, Brazil insists this text had a 
mere interpretative nature. That is, the prior Portaria No. 8/91 would have 
prohibited both used and reformed tires. Brazil believes that reformed tires are 
indeed used goods that underwent a process aiming to add a value into it and 
extent its durability. The entry of this sort of used goods into Brazilian territory was 
due to fails on the import system. The informational import system only considered 
the possibility of a good to be used or new and made no reference to the NCM, 
even because if it did, it would be difficult to make the distinction between used and 
new. This way, reformed tires were classified as new and thus were given the 
license to enter in Brazil. 
Because of this fraud, several imports in this situation were taken by the 
Customs and due to the increasing number of reformed tires import throughout the 
years, Brazil felt the necessity of clarifying the scope Portaria No. 8/91 had by 
clearly prohibiting the import of reformed tires. That is the very function given to the 
Portaria No. 8/00. Finally, in this sense, the ban on reformed tires import would not 
stand as a new and additional prohibition, as affirms Uruguay. 
As far as the CONAMA Resolution No. 258/99 is concerned, Brazil alleges 
that its reference to the import of remolded tires is only of a preventive nature. It 
actually meant that in case of an eventual import of remolded tires, they should 
also have a proper final disposal. Doing so, it would be by no means formally 
recognizing the import of remolded tires, even because it is not its function. 
                                                 
55
 See Arbitral Award VI – Tyres – from Uruguay to Brazil – 01/09/2002 
 32 
According to Brazil, the GMC Resolution No. 109/94 permits the parties to 
adopt its own economic policy on the areas where the harmonization of regulations 
was not yet reached. And this is exactly the case of used goods. Moreover, the 
very definition of used goods is let to each state define. The works of the 
Technique Comission III are proving that. 
Brazil states that its decision of considering reformed tires as used goods is 
not arbitrary. It is confirmed by Mercosur Technique Norms that define reformed 
tires as used goods that merely had added new material to be reused. Reformed 
tires have a much lower efficiency and durability than new ones. The classification 
of used and reformed tires in different subpositions within the NCM does not 
modify the fact that reformed tires, by their nature, are used goods that rapidly 
become an undesirable waste. Moreover, the same prohibition was applyied by 
Argentina, fact which Brazil utilizes to affirm that its position is by no means isolate 
or arbitrary. 
In this manner, Brazil alleged its trade policy measures fall under the 
exception on free-market provisions provided by the GMC Resolution No. 109/04.  
Brazil states that such an exception was not modified by the Decision No. 22/00, 
for it does not create new obligations of eliminating commercial restrictions. As 
Portaria No. 8/00 has only an interpretative nature, no new restrictions on market 
was made and this is how Brazil can not be accused of not observing Decision no. 
22/00. Finally, CMC Decision N 70/00 confirms the intention of the parties to the 
Mercosur to exclude pieces for vehicles apart of the free-market within Mercosur. 
Brazil concludes from the given that the pacta sunt servanda and good-faith 
Principles were not broken. As for the estoppel, Brazil denies any ground to 
Uruguay count with an expectation of continuity on the commerce of remolded 
tires. In this sense, it mentions a decision of the Regional Federal Tribunal of Rio 
Grande do Sul (TRF-RS), which decided eight months before the adoption of 
Portaria N 8/00 that it was legal the act of the Customs to retain remolded tires 
because Portaria 8/91 prohibited its import. A decision of its highest court, the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) in the same line is also mentioned. Brazil 
continues its argumentation remembering the Tribunal that the estoppel cannot 
originate from fraud. Furthermore, considering the mutually agreed autonomy 
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states parties to Mercosur had on ruling on used goods, the estoppel would also be 
also implausible. 
 
VII - The Decision: El VIº Laudo del Tribunal Arbitral ad hoc del 
Mercosur (TAHM) 
 
To define the object of controversy, the Tribunal reads article 28 of the 
Brasilia Protocol and affirms that the matter had to be limited on the papers 
submitted to the Arbitration. However, it is obvious that the theme had to be directly 
connected to the discussions of the diplomatic phase. Likewise, the Tribunal 
recognizes the Decree No. 3019/01 and INMETRO No. 133/01, but states that the 
analyzes of both will be strictly dependent of Portaria 8/91, for the former did not 
receive specific attention of Uruguay and the later has not a commercial nature and 
was mentioned generally for the sake of argument. As for the eventual normative 
acts that directly or indirectly difficult the commercial flow of retreated tires that was 
not specifically mentioned by Uruguay, the Tribunal decided it was too abstract and 
could not be considered part of the issues at stake. 
Letting the matter defined, the Tribunal enters the question quid iuris phase. 
By analyzing the Art. 19 (1) of the Brasilia Protocol, the Tribunal states that it will 
decide the matter based on the dispositions of the Assuncion Treaty, the related 
agreements, the CMC Decisions, the GMC Resolutions, the MERCOSUL 
Commercial Comission Guidelines and on the relevant principles and dispositions 
of international law. Furthermore, the interpretation of these provisions might be 
based on an integrational approach. 
The development of the integration principles´ analyzes led the Tribunal to 
clarify that commercial restrictive measures must observe the proportionality, i.e. 
the measure shall be applied only if there is no less restrictive possible actions; the 
mutually agreed reserved sovereignty, i.e. the exceptional accepted grounds to 
restrict the commerce as set in Art.50 of the Montevideu treaty; reasonability, 
meaning that the measure can not exceed in any way the legal objectives and, 
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finally, the commercial security, or in other words, the stability of the commercial 
environment. 
Presenting each party´s position on Portaria No.8/00, the Tribunal declares 
that the commercial flow of retreated tires between Brazil and Uruguay was indeed 
important, continuous and crescent, and the Brazilian authorities considered the 
prohibition set by Portaria No. 8/00 as referring only to used goods. That is, the 
Tribunal adopted the view presented by Uruguay. To demonstrate this reality, the 
Tribunal presents several texts (rules, acts, reports, etc.) coming from several 
Brazilian governamental organisms and remembered the allegation of Brazil that 
these texts are originated in organisms not responsible to international trade and 
thus should not be considered. The Tribunal responds affirming that, according to 
the International Law Commission on State Responsibility, and therefore to the 
international consuetudinary law, the conduct of every organisms belonging to a 
State shall be considered as an act of this very State. 
Interpreting the meaning of the Resolution 109/94, the Tribunal states that this 
text establishes an exception and must therefore be read in a restrictive manner. 
The very Decision 22/00, which Brazil believes is irrelevant to the matter, comes 
imposing a limit to the Resolution 109/94. That is, if by Resolution 109/94 it is true 
that Mercosur countries are free to rule on used goods, including on the definition 
of used goods, it is also true that with Decision 22/00 the status quo must be 
preserved. If, as observed by the Tribunal, the Brazilian regulatory system 
permitted the import of retreated tires before the adoption of Portaria No.8/00, the 
next Portaria adopted in 2000 is illegal because it creates a new prohibition that 
runs counter the Decision 22/00. Whereas the latter was adopted in June, Portaria 
No. 8/00 was adopted in September and therefore is not in due harmony with 
Mercosur provisions. From the given Portaria 8/00 also constitutes a “venire contra 
factum proprium”, - the principle of estoppel – and, finally, must be modified in 
order to establish the status quo ante, i.e. the important flow of retreated tires that 
once its regulatory system permitted. 
Nemine contradicente, the Portaria No.8/00 was declared incompatible with 
the Mercosur system and Brazil was given 60 days to modify it accordingly. Two 
months later, on March 8, Brazil adopted the Portaria SECEX No. 2/02 that 
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revoked the controversial Portaria No. 8/00. Later in time, in February 2003, it 
adopted the Decree 4.592/03 to provide the due exception56 to the fine established 
under the Decree 3.179/9957.  
The corrective measures were brought to the domestic courts both challenged 
by the Ministério Público Federal and as a result of an initial malfunction of the new 
dispositions, but environmental and constitutional appeals notwithstanding, in the 
end, the courts, including the highest constitutional court of Brazil, maintained 
decisions in harmony with the final ruling of the TAHM58. 
Finally, on December 1, 2003, the Portaria SECEX 2/02 was revoked by the 
Portaria SECEX No. 1759, which in November 17, 2004, was replaced by the 
Portaria No. 14/04. The latter is thus the basis of the Brazilian trade policy that 
establish an import ban on reformed tires providing an exception to the Mercosur 
Members. Naturally, this text inherited the luckless nature of its predecessor, the 
disputable Portaria No.8/00, and became the main object of a new dispute. 
Challenged by the European Union under the World Trade Organization, the 
Portaria No.14 of November 17, 2004, now takes the leading role in the next 
chapter of the tires question. However, it, and the other related instruments, 
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I - The Procedural Background 
 
The matter, as carried on before the World Trade organization, is set in 
motion in November, 15, 2005 with a formal complaint against the Brazilian 
measures formulated by the Bureau International Permanent des Associations de 
Vendeurs et Rechapeurs de Pneumatiques (BIPAVER) to the European 
Communities authorities pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/9460. 
The submission of this complaint led the European Comission to open an 
investigation whose conclusion was that the Brazilian measures were indeed illegal 
under the WTO commitments61. The problem inclined the EC to engage on coming 
to terms with the Brazilian government. The tentative of reaching a mutually 
satisfactory solution to the tires case by means of negotiation with Brazil occurred 
before, during and after that investigation62. As the parties always failed in this 
task, the case is formally brought to the World Trade Organization when the EC 
formally requests consultations with Brazil before this international organism (June 
20, 2005)63. In this occasion, the controversy is determined as relating to (a) the 
prohibition of the issuance of import licenses for retreated tires; (b) the fine of 400 
BRL per unit on the importation, marketing, storage and keeping of imported tires 
and (c) the exception given to Mercosur Members on both the import ban and 
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financial penalties64, which was the one established in response to the decision of 
the Mercosur panel studied in the prior Chapter to this paper.  
The consultations ended up bringing Argentina, which, presenting its 
commercial interests on the case, requests to be joined (July 6) 65. Brazil concedes 
on 20 July66. According to the EC, the consultations “took place in a constructive 
atmosphere” and provided relevant clarifications on the matter67, but, again, no 
solution to the controversy was agreed. Likewise, the EC finally requests the 
establishment of a Panel68 (November 17, 2005), but, when the DSB considered it, 
Brazil objected the establishment of the Panel by presenting a statement with its 
new environmental views (November 28)69. 
On January 20, 2006, the request was then renewed at the meeting of the 
DSB, according to Art. 6.1 of the CDU. The panel was established in the same day, 
for Brazil, as the part “in the dock”, could block the creation of the Panel only once, 
and as it had already so done before, now the Panel had to occur regardless of the 
Brazilian position. Brazil nevertheless submitted another statement to formalize its 
disagreement. This time more aggressive, Brazil affirms that the environmental 
risks used tires represent are undisputable and makes reference to the relevant EC 
legislation, stating that the EU position in the case, whenever considered their 
domestic rules, is contradictory, for, whereas the latter asserts the need of waste 
prevention and of not exporting waste to non-EC countries, now they behave, 
Brazil affirms, overlooking the right of Brazil of preventing the accumulation of 
wastes. As the European Union is of the view that retreated tires are actually not 
wastes, Brazil states that this thesis is also inassimilable, for this material is made 
of “at least 70% of waste” and “will generate waste in short time” to be disposed in 
Brazil70. In this wise, Brazil defends the idea that the EC consciously intends to use 
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the Brazilian territory as a disposal area of European wastes and it is said very 
clearly, even literally71. 
The statements of Brazil notwithstanding, the process proceeds and on 
March, 6, 2006, the EC requests the Direcotor-General to determine the 
composition of the panel. On March, 16, the panel was then constituted, being Mr. 
Mitsuo Matshushita the Chairman and the Members Mr Donald M. McRae and Mr 
Chang-Fa Lo. 
The EC First Written Submission was delivered on April, 27, 2006, and the 
Brazilian First Written Submission on June, 8. The first meeting of the Panel took 
place on July, 5-7. Later on, the Second Written Submission of both Brazil and EC 
were delivered on August, 11.  The second meeting took place in September, 4.  
On June 12, 2007, the report of the Panel was ready.  The decision held that the 
Brazilian policy (ban, fine, etc.) was inconsistent with Article XI:1 of GATT 1994 
and not justified under Article XX(b) of GATT 1884. On September 2007 the 
European Communities appealed to the Appellate Body, though. This body upheld 
the Panel´s decision that the ban can be regarded as “necessary” according to 
Article XX(b) but reversed the Panel´s view that the MERCOSUR exemption has 
not resulted in arbitrary discrimination. 
Briefly given the dynamics of the parties in court, we shall analyze what were 
the allegations of the parties in order to visualize how exactly the same import ban 
on retreated tires became an environmental discussion under the WTO72. 
 
II - The European Allegation 
 
a) Material facts 
The EC first defines the scope of the dispute by presenting the concept of 
retreated tires. Its point is to clearly make the distinction between used and 
retreated tires looking forward making the later equivalent to new tires. This is, in 
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fact, at the heart of the European position, just as it is for the Brazilian defense to 
associate retreated tires with waste tires. 
This important matter continues to be dealt with during most of the factual 
allegation. For instance, the retreating process is also described in the EC First 
Submission always emphasizing the rigidity of the security rules that regulate such 
activity. That is, it aims to demonstrate that the quality of a retreated tire is not 
considerably distant of a new one´s. Interestingly, when describing the retreating 
process, or, more precisely, the tires that will suffer this process, the European 
Union makes the idea of a used tire smoother when it gives preference to the 
adjective “worn” and later the substantive “casing”73 to refer to what Brazil actually 
more frequently calls “used” instead. This difference revels, once again, how the 
nature of the retreated tires is at the core of the dispute. Furthermore, to make 
retreated tires nearer of new ones, the EC makes it clear that, although the security 
rules limit the retreating process to only one for commercial vehicles´ tires, this 
product is made to have such a life-span that it could suffer the retreating process 
3 or 4 times, to do not mention other types of tires such as those of aircraft and 
trucks, which have not the same limit and can be retreated twice the number of 
times commercial vehicles can74. The EC goes beyond and literally affirms that 
retreated tires are similar to new ones in every aspect of performance, safety and 
durability75. It states that although Brazil refers to retreated tires as “short life-span 
products”, Brazil allows the retreating process, which, as the EC infers, proves that 
Brazil does not consider it an inferior type of tire76 and, in the same sense, it also 
mentions the statement of Brazilian senators and even the Director of INMETRO, 
Alfredo Lobo, who also says that retreated and new tires are comparable on 
durability and security77.  
In this sense, the EC later directly censures the Brazilian contrary efforts. 
That is, they affirm Brazil tries to blur the boundaries of retreated and waste tires78. 
It is a direct attack to the Brazilian tendency of emphasizing the problems of tires 
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wastes disproportionally – the greater part of Brazilian statements is composed of 
the negative effects of waste tires and, indeed, one can say the link between waste 
and retreated tires is therefore somehow overlooked. Not less important, and 
following the same reasoning, the EC also rejects the Brazilian allegation that 
retreated tires are “short life-span products” that quickly becomes waste. Hence, it 
is possible to note that the EC programmatically and efficiently refutes every 
possibility of defense. However, of course, the material allegation that retreated 
tires are “low-quality” or “short life-span products” in contrast to equivalent to new 
ones and vice-versa, just like any other material affirmation, is a matter of fact that 
must be analyzed by specialists in order to solve the controversy. But it must 
neither be forgotten that Brazil did not present the statement of specialists to 
support its material allegations in the first two statements. 
In addition, the EC also refers to the environmental benefits of retreated 
tires. Based on a document of the Environment Agency of the United Kingdom, it 
affirms that retreated tires are environmentally friendly because its use “leads to 
considerable savings in terms of energy, materials, and emissions”79.  
Finally, any possibility Brazil had to defend itself without directly challenging 
the facts presented by the EC vanishes when the later proves with Brazilian data 
that, after the legal measures challenged, whereas the imports of retreated tires 
from the EC fell from more than 10 million tires per year to a virtual zero, the import 
of used tires also from the EC dramatically increased from about 10 million per 
year to more than 70 million of tires per year80. As the European Union affirms, it 
shows that the Brazilian ban on retreated tires was only positive to Brazilian 
retreaders, who buy used tires from the EC to add the new material and sell them 
within the national market never worried about the competition with European 
retreaders. This fact alone already proves that the Brazilian casings in general 
cannot be retreated, for “the poor condition of the road infrastructure in Brazil, 
driving habits, and poor vehicle maintenance” results in used tires in such poor 
conditions that no retreating process is ever possible81.  Likewise, Brazilian 
retreaders need the European used tires to operate and import them despite of the 
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ban on importation of used tires that stands sine 1991, because, as this prohibition 
is not regulated in detail, the retreaders make use of this weakness of the 
legislation and get liberation to import via judicial decisions82. It is not necessary to 
note that this is a clue of a disguised protectionist measure. 
 
 
b) legal facts 
The EC analyzes each of the challenged measures contrasting them with 
the WTO dispositions to demonstrate that they are not compatible with each other. 
This study naturally starts with the import ban on retreated tires, which, by this 
time, is in operation in Brazil by virtue of Portaria SECEX No. 14 of 17 November 
2004. 
Specifically, the ban would run counter, first of all, the Article XI GATT, 
which reads: 
 
No prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made 
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
institutes or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party or the exportation or sale for export of any 
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. 
 
As Brazil always raised environmental appeals to sustain its measures, the 
main efforts of the EC are towards showing that the Brazilian measures are not 
compatible with the exception of the Article XX (b) and (g) GATT, which provides 
the following: 
 
Subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
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international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption. 
 
The WTO prior decisions reveal that to have a measure under the Article XX 
(b), it must be proved that the same act is both a policy designed to protect human 
life or health and that the measure is necessary to reach this objective. 
Likewise, the EC sustains that the challenged measure could not have been 
designed to protect human life or health because there is no health risk involved83. 
In this sense, it reaffirms that retreated tires are not wastes, but to the contrary, 
equivalent to new ones and that their fabrication involves methods that eliminate 
viruses, bacteria and insects84. Moreover, the measures would not be necessary 
firstly because the import of retreated tires does not result in an increase number of 
waste tires to be disposed of in Brazil, for Brazil must import used European tires 
to retreat, and also because there are reasonable alternatives to the import ban if 
one ever considers, arguendo, retreated tires do imply on risk85. This alternative, 
the EC believes, is already applied in Brazil via CONAMA Resolution No. 258/99 
as amended by Resolution No.301/02: to make mandatory for domestic tires 
producers and importers to provide an adequate disposal of unusable tires. 
The same logic is applied to contrast the import ban with the exception 
provided by the Article XX (g). Affirming that this disposition, according to the 
previous WTO decisions, requires a consistent link of cause and effect between 
the measure and the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, the EC 
sustains it is impossible to establish this link because, if one considers that 
Brazilian allegations towards waste tires are accurate, once again it should be said 
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that retreated tires are not waste and donnot contribute to the accumulation of 
waste tires in Brazil since the used tires of this country in general cannot be 
retreated. In this wise, it affirms that retreated tires become wastes just like any 
product, and if the WTO authorize the Brazilian measure based on this, it should 
also liberate the Member countries to impose an import ban on whatever product, 
for they always eventually become wastes. Moreover, the lack of relations between 
the ban and the conservation of natural resources would be clearer if one 
considers that several types of tires can actually be retreated several times and 
thus are much farther of the notion of wastes. It is interesting to note that the EC 
states that an additional evidence that the Brazilian measure maintain no link with 
the protection of the environment rests on the prior case before the Mercosur 
Arbitral Tribunal. This is so exactly because, on that opportunity, Brazil raised no 
environmental defense86. 
The EC argues that neither the ban fulfill the second part of the Article XX 
(g), for no restrictions are imposed to tires retreated in Brazil. In this sense the EC 
presents a statement of the Appellate Body in the United States – Gasoline 
affirming that measure of this kind could not but be a discrimination to support 
locally-produced goods87. 
Although already sustaining that the import ban does not fulfill the requisites 
of the incises (b) and (g), the EC also argues that the measure does not satisfy the 
“Chapeau” of the Article XX. This disposition is intended to prevent abuses of the 
exceptions established by the incises and, according to prior Appellate Body 
decisions, it is analyzed after it is seen that the measure is adequate with the 
incises. 
In this manner, the ban would be arbitrary and unjustifiable, the EC 
continues, because there is an exception to Mercosur countries. Considering that 
retreated tires have the same environmental externalities irrespective of where 
they come from, the measure is clearly arbitrary. The import ban cannot be 
reasonable also because the tires retreated in Brazil are made of imported used 
tires due to interim relief adopted by Brazilian courts. 
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Finally, the import ban, the EC concludes, is a disguised restriction on 
international trade because the structure of the Brazilian legislation points out in 
this direction88. The import ban was established by SECEX, which is a commercial 
organ of the Brazilian government and not an environmental one. The CONAMA, 
an organ responsible to the protection of the environment, however, in the 
CONAMA Resolution No. 23/1996 did not prohibit the import of retreated tires, but 
only the import of used tires. EC suggests, remembering the draft decree law No. 
243/2000, that the ban was a byproduct of the lobby of domestic retreaders who 
did not want to compete with the European retreated tires89, even because, as 
explained before, they usually import the used tires from Europe to only make the 
retreating process in Brazil. 
The last but not the least, the Mercosur exception is also directly challenged, 
but now as being contrary to Articles XIII:1 and I:1 GATT. The former provides the 
following: 
 
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the 
importation of any product of the territory of any other party or on the exportation of 
any product destine for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the 
importation of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like 
product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted. 
 
From the given, it seems clear the incompatibility of the Brazilian measures 
on the import ban and the fines on the importation, marketing, transportation, 
storage, keeping or warehousing of imported retreated tires. The EC sustains the 
same happens with Art. I:1. It reads: 
 
With respect to customs, duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments 
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and 
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation 
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and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III, any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties. 
 
Naturally, the retreated tires from EC (“like products”) received no 
unconditional and immediate offer of the advantages given to Mercosur Members, 
and this is why the EC concludes that the Art. I:1 was not observed either. 
However, WTO rules provide an exception of trade liberalization necessary 
to the formation of a customs union of free trade area in the Article XXVI:5:  
 
A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs 
territory for two or more customs territories, so that 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XI and XX) are eliminated with respect 
to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of commerce are applied by eah of the members of the union to the trade 
of territories not included in the union 
 
A customs union is defined in Article XXIV:8 GATT as follows: 
 
Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade 
area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area; Provided that: 
(a) with respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a formation of 
a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the 
institution of any such union or intereim agreement in respect of trade with 
contracting parties not parties to such union or agreement shall not on the whole be 
 46 
higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of 
commerce applicable in the consitutent territories prior to the formation of such 
union or be the adoption of such interim agreement, as the case may be; 
 
The EC believes that the fact that the Brazilian defense is based on Article 
XX GATT, which is explicitly excluded by Article CCIV:8 (a) (i) GATT from the 
requirements of eliminate commercial restrictions, makes it impossible to be 
“necessary” as asks Article XXIV:5 GATT90. In this wise, if the Brazilian ban and 
fines on imported retreated tires ever becomes acceptable before the Art. XX, the 
Mercosur exception had logically be misplaced. 
Conclusively, the EC demonstrate that Brazil cannot justify its measures on 
the basis of the Enabling Clause, which reads: 
 
Following the negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES decide as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of  Article 1 of the General Agreement, contracting 
parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties. 
The provisions of paragraph 1 apply to the following: 
a) […] 
b) […] 
c) Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting 
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with 
criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported 
from one another; 
d) […] 
Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause: 
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shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not 
to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trader of any other contracting 
parties; 
shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions to trade on a most favoured nation basis 
[…] 
 
By analyzing these provisions the EC argues the Enabling Clause is not 
applicable because, first, it provides an exception only to Article I:1 GATT and 
therefore donnot encompasses the Article XIII:1 GATT, also incompatible with the 
measures challenged91; second, paragraph 2 (c) makes reference to regional 
arrangements that have criteria for the elimination of non-tariff measures, which is 
not the case in Mercosur (in this circumstances it would be possible to invoke this 
disposition only to defend tariff measures)92; third, paragraph 3 (a) states the 
measure must not create trade difficulties with other contracting parties, but it is 
exactly what happens according to the prior arguments intended to prove that the 
measures were an arbitrary and unjustifiable; fourth, the Brazilian measures also 
run counter paragraph 3 (a) that states that the Enabling Clause cannot be invoked 
in such a manner that would impede the most-favored nation basis for reduction 
and elimination of tariffs  and other restrictions to trade. 
 
III – The Brazilian Defense 
 
a) material facts 
Brazil brings to court the same material facts brought in its prior statements. 
This is how substantial accommodation to the EC argumentation remained 
punctual. In fact, Brazil affirms that the rebuttal to the EC´s First Written 
Submission would be given only in the Second Written Submission93. Likewise, it 
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first described, once again, but now with more details, how the accumulation of 
waste tires poses a threat to human health and the environment, once again 
emphasizing associated diseases and toxins liberated by the same wastes. 
Subsequently, Brazil highlights the difficulties of dealing with waste tires illustrating 
how whatever method present in the world today aiming to minimize the effects of 
waste tires is still costly, limited and often considerably inefficient, resulting in the 
continuity of the problem imposed by this sort of wastes. 
Considering the moment of the dispute, i.e. the EC argumentation, the most 
pertinent Brazilian allegation in the First Written Submission rests in its exposition 
of how the export of retreated tires to Brazil exacerbate the waste management 
problem94. However, even at this moment Brazil insists on not better explaining the 
equivalent treatment that it gives to both waste and retreated tires and solely 
reaffirms that both are prejudicial to the national waste management while basically 
discoursing upon waste tires. The nearest Brazil goes of adequately providing an 
answer to the centrally important EC allegation that retreated tires are equivalent to 
new ones is to reaffirm that retreated tires are discriminated by European 
consumers95, but no technical studies is offered to challenge the EC allegation at 
the same level. Nevertheless, Brazil presents an important allegation directly 
against the EC statement that Brazilian used tires are rarely suitable for retreating.  
This actually is a determinant question for the material, and consequently also the 
legal, analyzes of the case. According to Brazil, 30 percent of its used passenger 
car tires are suitable for retreating, while in the UK only 30-10, Australia 15-20 and 
US merely 12 percent96. Concurrently, Brazil affirms that actively promotes the 
retreating of its tires and boasts a well-established retreating industry that retreats 
a substantial part of the tires it consumes per year97. 
As for the ban itself, Brazilian material allegation emphasizes that a similar 
policy is adopted by several countries, namely Argentina, Bangladesh, Bahrain, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand and Venezuela98. And in this sense it is also affirmed 
that whereas this restriction is a need for developing countries, it is not necessary 
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for the EC99. Brazil describes the national policy towards waste tires and 
measures taken to deal with the adverse environmental effects thereof, also putting 
the challenged measures in this context, i.e. as equivalent. 
 
 
b) legal facts 
The Brazilian attempt is to demonstrate that the import ban, although prima 
facie contrary to Article XI:1, is justified by Article XX (b); that the fines, if 
alternatively contrary to Article XI:1 and Article III:4, are justified by Article XX (b) 
and (d); and, finally, that the Mercosur exemption, even if contrary to Articles XIII:1 
and I:1, are authorized by Article XXIV and justified by Article XX (d). 
Brazil argues that the import ban is a measure that falls within the range of 
policies designed to protect fundamental interest of the society, i.e. their health and 
the environment. In this sense, it briefly restates the adverse effects of waste tires 
and affirms, without developing an argumentation, that this measure is not different 
of that one of France in the EC – Asbestos.  
Based on Appellate Body prior decisions, Brazil decided to prove that the 
import ban fulfills the necessity requirements by separately analyzing (a) the 
importance of the interests protected by the measure; (b) the contribution of the 
measure to the end pursued; (c) the trade impact of the measure; and (d) the 
existence of alternative measures that a Member could reasonably be expected to 
employ. 
 The importance of a measure really intended to protect the environment 
and the health of human beings rests beyond doubt and the Appellate Body itself 
already acknowledged such a fact in prior cases100. In fact, the very exception 
brought by Article XX GATT is a full evidence of that. 
To sustain that the measure contributes to the end pursued, Brazil states 
that, as retreated tires cannot be retreated again, the import ban, forcing the 
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retreatment of tires used in Brazilian territory, reduces the amount of waste tires 
and, therefore, the problems associated therewith.  
Brazil argues that the trade impact of the ban does not favor the national tire 
industry inasmuch CONAMA Resolution 258/1999 makes mandatory the proper 
dispose of waste tires in the proportion of import and/or production and the 
production coasts to retreaders grows higher because the import of cheap foreign 
casings is prohibited. 
The analysis of an alternative measure is made with a study of the 
CONAMA Resolution No.258/909 as emended by Resolution 301/02, which the 
European Union denounces as being a less restrictive alternative. In so doing, 
Brazil acts correctly since it is up to the complaining party to demonstrate the 
existence of an alternative measure101. In this sense, the core of the defense 
rests on the fact that the import ban prevents the generation of wastes, while the 
Resolution referred above only deals with the disposal of wastes, which always 
implies in costs and inefficiencies102. 
The analyzes of the measure gains a focus on how it is applied in order to 
prove that it fulfills the requirements established by the chapeau of the Article XX 
GATT, which determines that the challenged measure shall not be applied in a 
manner that constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
Brazil remembers that the provisions of the chapeau do not refer to the 
same standards of discrimination of those present to other substantive obligations 
of GATT.103 Thus, the relevance of an argument that looks forward pointing out a 
discrimination based on products origin is restricted to the analyzes of Articles I:1 
and III:4, being only relevant to precise whether the measure is applied reasonably, 
that is, that the measure is not arbitrary. Likewise, Brazil states that the import ban 
cannot be considered arbitrary because it is not “based on mere opinion or 
preference” nor is it “unrestrained in the exercise of will or authority”104. 
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Additionally, Brazil affirms that the exemption to Mercosur Members can neither be 
seen as arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination since it was established exactly to 
adhere to the rule of law105. 
Finally, Brazil argues that the import ban, although resulting in a restriction 
of international trade, is actually not disguised106. Brazil sustains that the measure 
does not favor domestic new tires manufacturers of new tires nor is intended to do 
so to national retreaders, who, under the same legal system, are required to follow 
environmental requirements and are prohibited to import used tires to retreat, 
which are preferred by domestic retreaders not because Brazilian used tires are 
unsuitable for retreating but rather because foreign used tires are a lot cheaper 
than national ones107. And the used tires imports made under preliminary 
injunctions will soon stop occurring, for within Brazilian higher courts progressively 
prevails the understanding that these injunctions are legally erroneous and thus the 
temporary imports are getting upheld108. 
Brazil is also of the view that the fines, as made to enforce the import ban, 












                                                 
105
 Idem, pg.50, 138. 
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 Idem, pg 52, 146. 
107
 Idem, pg.55, 151. 
108
 Idem, pg.56, 153. 
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I - The Mercosur treatment on the Environment 
 
The Mercosur is a Regional Trade Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. It aims to reach a deep integration, with a full 
common market, also having a common foreign relations policy and common 
formulation of macroeconomic and sectorial policies109. Being the biggest food 
producer of the world110, Mercosur also has huge environmental attributes. It 
extends for over most of South America, which boast paramount water resources, 
the biggest tropical forest and the richest biological diversity on the Earth111. The 
combination of its enormous economic and environmental prominences could not 
but lead to significant environmental regulations. 
Although portion of the scholars believe the Partial Agreement on 
Cooperation and Goods Exchange Defending and Protecting the Environment112 to 
be the first Mercosur legal instrument dealing with the environment113, it is always 
important to remember that the Preamble to the very Asuncion Treaty makes an 
influential environmental appeal. After affirming the importance of market 
integration for the “economic development with social justice”, which is the main 
Mercosur`s goal, the parties to the Asuncion Treaty state that  
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 http://www.esaf.fazenda.gov.br/parcerias/ue/cedoc-ue/no-brasil/texto-mercosul.html (27 May 2007) 
110
 http://www.zonaeconomica.com/mercosur/cumbre (27 May 2007) 
111
 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/revista/Rev_77/artigos/Leyza-rev77.htm (27 May 2007) 
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  In Portuguese: Acordo Parcial de Cooperação e Intercambio de Bens em Defesa e Proteção do Meio 
Ambiente. 
113
 Cf. GAUDINO Erica, La Variable Ambiental em el Processo de Integracion Del MERCOSUR, in 
Interaccion, Desarrollo Sustentable y Medio Ambiente (Coria, Silvia and Gaudino Erica, ed. Ciudad 
Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1997, p.75)  
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that this objective may be achieved through a more efficient utilization of available 
resources, the environment preservation, the improvement of physical 
interconnections, the coordination of macro-economic policies for complementation 
of different economic areas based on the principles of graduallity, flexibility and 
balance. (originally not underlined) 
 
But, obviously, the environmental concerns of the Mercosur go far beyond 
these dispositions. In 1991, for instance, dispositions of the CMC Resolution 03/91, 
in line with the second and sixth Articles of the Asuncion Treaty, stated the need of 
the Sectorial Agreements hold environmental protective dispositions114. But it was 
yet in the following year that a crucial step was given. By virtue of the 1992 Earth 
Summit (ECO 92)115, based in Brazil, the need of an environmental commitment 
taken by the South America countries led to the adoption of the Canela Declaration 
on February 21, 1992. Being Chile also a contracting party thereto, the Canela 
Declaration, which comes to reaffirm the regional environmental concerns, makes 
reference to, inter alia, the need of protecting the atmosphere, the biological 
diversity, water resources, the forests, the management of wastes and the 
strengthening of institutional arrangements in order to reach a sustainable 
development116.  
Having thus permanently established the environmental problematic within 
the Mercosur, the contracting parties met again in Las Lenas, Argentina, in June 
1992, and agreed on several goals and deadlines to be met. The Sub-groups to 
the Common Market Group (CMG) nº 7, 8 and 9, were then given environmental 
tasks and even institutions according to their different areas of work, respectively: 
Industrial and Technological Policy, agricultural policy and energetic policy. 
Furthermore, in Las Lenas the parties to the Mercosur also decided to establish the 
Specialized Meeting on the Environment (REMA) via Resolution nº 22/92.  
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 http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/revista/Rev_77/artigos/Leyza-rev77.htm (27 May 2007) 
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 LOPES, Fernando Augusto Montai y; BELINCANTA, Fernando César. Estudo da evolução do tratamento 
ambiental no Mercosul: do Tratado de Assunção até o Acordo Quadro sobre Meio Ambiente. Jus Navigandi, 
Teresina, ano 6, n. 59, out. 2002.  
116 FREITAS JÚNIOR, Antonio de Jesus da Rocha. Considerações acerca do Direito Ambiental do Mercosul 
. Jus Navigandi, Teresina, ano 8, n. 136, 19 nov. 2003. 
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The REMA was deemed to be in charge of studying the environmental 
legislation of the member countries and presenting recommendations to the 
Common Market Group, having, in the end, met five times throughout its existence 
(November 1993 – November 1994). It is during the third meeting, however, that 
the parties adopted the Resolution nº 10/94, which held the Mercosur Basic 
Guidelines on Environmental Policy. This instrument recommend a variety of 
environmental measures and ended to be the seed of the eventual Additional 
Protocol on the Environment Project. 
The REMA was brought to an end after the adoption of the Ouro Preto 
Protocol on December, 1994, on the moment in which the Mercosur´s Ministers of 
the Environment met for the first time. It was on June, 1995, that they adopted the 
Taranco Declaration and decided to improve the environmental structural 
organization of the Mercosur by transforming the REMA in the CMG Sub-group nº 
6, the first Sub-group to be entirely in charge of environmental issues. According to 
the GMC Resolution 28/95, its priority areas had specific goals, v.g.: 1) non-tariffs 
restrictive measures related to the environment, proposing ways to harmonize 
them; 2) the competitiveness and the environment, studying ways to valorize the 
environmental costs within the production process and permit a fair trade within 
and out of Mercosur; 3) international law, analyzing the discussions and 
implementation of international standards; 4) sectorial issues, study the proposes 
of the other specialized Sub-groups; 5) the elaboration of a single environmental 
instrument to be adopted by the Mercosur; 6) the creation of an informational 
system on the environment between the contracting parties and 6) the elaboration 
of an eco-label system. 
In Addition to the agreements signed by the Mercosur bloc with other 
countries and economic blocs expressing environmental concerns, the work of the 
Sub-group nº 6 eventually culminated on an ad hoc group responsible for the 
environmental information system within the Mercosur and on the approval of 
several work programs. Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that the Additional Protocol on 
the Environment Project, based on the Mercosur environmental guidelines of the 
GMC Resolution 10/94, was sent to the GMC and rejected. Scholars believe the 
text was not accepted owing to its impreciseness, lack of attention to important 
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themes and bad issues structure117. Even though, it tends to be seen as quite 
audacious because of its comprehensiveness118. 
However, mostly due to the civil society appeals, especially in Uruguay, the 
rejected Protocol was reformulated to eventually bring to life the Mercosur 
Framework Agreement on the Environment (Florianopolis Agreement)119, adopted 
on March, 2001, during the IV Extraordinary SGT nº6 Meeting in the Brazilian 
southern city of Florianópolis. The Florianópolis Agreement recalls the texts 
emerged during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, including the Agenda 21, and provides the basis for the Mercosur 
environmental law, as it follows the framework approach, meaning that more 
detailed considerations will be eventually added by Protocols. This is how 
controversial issues present on the prior Additional Protocol on the Environment 
Project, such as the treatment to be given to transgenic products and the 
application of the Precautionary Principle without the necessity of proof to embargo 
importations120, were let apart. The pragmatism of this shorter and less ambitious 
text has divided the public opinion, triggering much criticism, but also praises. 
 To sum up, the clear existence of Mercosur environmental concerns 
due to its extensive environmental regulations leads to the conclusion that it is not 
necessary to mention other and less important dispositions on the environment 
adopted by this commercial bloc. However, the exception to this fact rests on one 
of the oldest texts relative to the Mercosur121: the 1980 Montevideu Treaty. The 
Article 50 to this agreement provides an exception to the free market requirements 
of Mercosur similar to that of the GATT´s Article XX within the WTO or the Article 
60 to the Roma Treaty within the EU. It reads: 
 
No disposition in this Treaty shall be interpreted as impediment to the adoption and 
accomplishment of measures destined to: 
                                                 
117






 This last theme is considerably important and the Mercosur position thereto will be seen on the study of 
the TPR decision in the following part of this Chapter. 
121
 The Asuncion Treaty, on the Article 2, inc. D, refers to the 1980 Montevideu Treaty´s Article 50 as a still 
valid disposition to limit the free trade principle. 
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Protection of public morals;  
Application of security laws and regulations; 
Regulation of importation or exportation of weapons, ammunition and other war 
materials and, in exceptional circumstances, of all other military Article s; 
Protection of human, animal or plant life and health; 
Importation and exportation of gold and silver metallic; 
Protection of national patrimony of artistical, historical or archeological value; and 
Exportation, utilization and consumption of nuclear materials, radioactive products or 
any other material used in the development or utilization of nuclear energy.122 
 
Needless to say, this disposition is quintessential to the aims of this 
investigation. Luckily, it was recalled and applied on a concrete case before the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of Mercosur. This case is virtually identical to the 




II - Environmental Embargo on a Practical Case: The Mercosur 
Problematic of the Retreated Tires Trade Relaunched 
 
a) The Case 
  
 A few years after the dispute involving Brazil and Uruguay on the Brazilian 
embargo of retreated tires, the later country opened a new challenge within 
Mercosur, but now against the Republic of Argentina, whose politic of also 
imposing an embargo to the import of retreated tires negatively affected the 
Uruguayan economy. The Argentinean policy is mostly represented on the Law nº 
25.626, enacted in 2002.  
The proceedings started on November, 2004, and the decision of the ad hoc 
Tribunal was made by October 25, 2005. Now, however, as far as this decision is 
                                                 
122
 Full text can be found on: 
http://www2.uol.com.br/actasoft/actamercosul/espanhol/tratado_de_montevideu.htm (27 May 2007) 
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concerned, the answer was an environmental one, for Argentina gave the 
environment a chance by recalling the exception provided by the Article 50 of the 
1980 Montevideu Treaty. 
According to Argentina, which also previously ruled that the import of used 
tires was forbidden (cf. Decree 660/00, Art. 38), the law nº 25.626 merely came 
into being with the purpose of making it clear that the Decree 660 prohibition 
actually encompassed the import of retreated tires. Uruguay, once again, affirmed 
the embargo set by the law nº25.626 was a new one and overlapped a continuous 
and legal flow of Uruguayan retreated tires into Argentina. 
Furthermore, Uruguay attests the quality of retreated tires, affirming that 
Argentina ignored the true differences between those tires and new ones. Not 
involving different security or environmental problems different from those of a new 
tires, retreated tires, Uruguay continues, could not suffer the Argentinean embargo 
based on whatever exception of the Article 50 to the Montevideu Treaty. In this 
sense, the embargo was contrary to the free market provisions of the Articles 1 and 
5 to the Asuncion Treaty and several international principles of law, such as the 
pacta sunt servanda, good faith and estoppel. 
The overwhelming similarities with the prior case involving Brazil continues 
as Argentina complains against the unwilling of Uruguay to reach a solution during 
the consult phase and claims the general Uruguayan challenge had to be restricted 
solely to the law nº 25.626. The similarities finish, however, as, Argentina, to the 
contrary of Brazil, allege to be driven by environmental concerns, therefore asking 
for the application of the exceptions found on Article 50 to the Montevideu Treaty 
given that the measure challenged is, indeed, exceptional, proportional, non-
discriminatory and there is not a less restrictive alternative measure thereto. 
 
B) The Decision 
 
The Ad Hoc Tribunal notes that it rested uncontroversial not only both the 
Mercosur free market dispositions and the environmental exceptions thereto, but 
also the fact that a commercial flow of Uruguayan retreated tires existed especially 
during the period of time that comes from 1997 to 2001. Given that, it affirms that 
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two principles clashes, the free market and the environment ones, and that it is 
necessary to precise, given the circumstances of the case, which one prevails123. 
After an extensive reference to international dispositions on the matter to be 
found on other international fora, including Article XX to the GATT, and also inside 
the Mercosur, emphasizing that the Asuncion Treaty accepted the environmental 
factor and the Florianópolis Agreement had foreseen the trade-environment conflict 
on its Article 3, inter alios, the Tribunal concludes that the preservation of the 
environment is highly necessary and is, indeed, an objective of the Mercosur, but it 
must not be recalled to justify an arbitrary measure. The Tribunal also reminds that 
the reaffirmation of the free trade principle, present on the Decision 22/00, whose 
role was to relaunch Mercosur, makes a clear reference to the exceptions of the 
Article 50. Furthermore, the CMC Decision 57/00, which comes to complement the 
Decision 22/00, states the necessity of safeguarding principles for the protection of 
life and public security. In addition, beyond all that, the principles of economic 
integration must be seen in due harmony with the principles of proportionality, 
reasonability, sovereignty124. In this line, the precautionary principle is also 
reaffirmed by the decision125. 
With due consideration to all the given, the ad hoc Tribunal decides that the 
dispute is limited to the contents of the law nº 25.626, which, although contrary to 
the free-market dispositions, must be accepted for environmental reasons. That is, 
due to the uncontroversial environmental problematic nature of used tires, even 
considering that one of the research institutes affirmed retreated tires can boast the 
same durability of a new one126, the Argentinean measure can be justified 
inasmuch retreated tires increase the environmental passive of the importer 
country. It happens because although new tires can be retreated once, retreated 
tires cannot be retreated again. Finally, the Uruguayan appeal to the estoppel 
principle was refuted on the basis of the short period of time and volume of the 
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 Argentina - Proibição de Importação de Pneumáticos Remodelados Procedentes do Uruguai. Laudo 
Arbitral, item 56. 
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 Idem, item 66. 
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 Idem, item.70. 
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 The Brazilian IPT – Instituto de Pesquisas Tecnológicas – concluded that, in relation to new tires, retreated 
tires have a durability of 30%. On the other hand, the Argentinean INTI – Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia 
Industrial – found that retreated tires can have a durability of 100%. 
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import of retreated tires from Uruguay to Argentina and the very relativity with 
which the free-trade dispositions must be analyzed. 
 
 
C) The Decision of the Permanent Appeals Tribunal 
 
As the determination of the Ad Hoc Tribunal (arbitration painel) was positive 
to Argentina, Uruguay makes use of the second stage set by the 2002 Olivos 
Protocol on the Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, appealing to the Mercosur 
Permanent Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal Permanente de Revisión del Mercosur) on 
November 9, 2005. 
The Permanent Appeals Tribunal (hereinafter TPR) denies the clash of two 
principles referred by the Ad Hoc Tribunal, affirming that there is not but the 
principle of free trade and exceptions thereto. These exceptions, including the 
environmental one, can be found on the 1980 Montevideu Treaty, which, however, 
does not provide a proper detailed analyzes of the requirements necessary for the 
due application of these same exceptions on a concrete case. Likewise, it is the 
role of the Tribunal to set jurisprudence to answer this question whenever studying 
the given cases. The TPR heavily criticizes the Ad Hoc Tribunal for not doing so 
and thus set its own four dimensional criteria for the application of the 
environmental exception given by the Article 50, D. 
Firstly, it must be determined whether the measure implies on a free trade 
restriction. Obviously, a positive answer to this question does not necessarily lead 
to the inviability of this measure, for it can fulfill the objective justification provided 
by the next three steps of the evaluation. 
If the measure is restrictive, it is required to shed light on the discriminatory 
character of the challenged measure, which, as a matter of fact, can be direct or 
indirect. It happens to be indirect when the measure is applied equally to nationals 
and foreigners but the effects thereof are actually different. The TPR concludes 
then that the measure is clearly directly discriminatory considering the national  
Argentinean products vis-à-vis foreigners not only from Uruguay but from all over 
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the world. Affirming that the fact that the measure is both restrictive and 
discriminatory does not lead to the conclusion that they are contrary to Mercosur 
law, the TPR goes further to the analyzes of the third criterion. 
 The Argentinean measure finally fails within the third, the justification test. 
At this moment it is necessary to consider whether the measure claiming to be an 
environmental propose effectively has the preservation of the environment as its 
objective. The TPR decides the Argentinean embargo has not the alleged 
environmental goal, for, during the elaboration of the law, the representatives made 
literal reference to the “protection of the national industry that produce such goods” 
even before the environmental question appears during the discussions127.  
Assuming, arguendo, that the challenged measure had been justified under 
the prior assessment, it would then come the most difficult step: the matter of 
proportionality. The latter is a general principle related also by the necessity and 
the possible existence of less restrictive measures. The embargo is, from this 
analyzes, therefore equally incompatible to the Mercosur law given that its claimed 
environmental harm is neither serious nor irreversible and, in addition, it is not the 
less restrictive alternative measure and does not avoid the harm. In fact, the TPR 
concludes, it would be better to Argentina to orient its policy towards the limitation 
and elimination of waste tires128. 
Having considered the Argentinean measure to be contrary to the 
Integration Law, the TPR continues considering other relevant topics rose during 
the discussions. By analyzing the applicability of the Precautionary Principle, the 
TPR affirms there was no need to bring such a principle into consideration, for both 
Uruguay and Argentina recognized the environmental problematic of waste tires. In 
addition, this principle can justify environmental measures, but they must equally 
fulfill the four dimensional criteria established before. As for the burden of proof 
inversion, allegedly associated with the Precautionary Principle, it is denied given 
that such an inversion must be literally present in the legal text, which does not 
occur in the given case.  
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The last but not the least, the TPR agrees with the Ad Hoc tribunal on the 
fact that the Estoppel Principle is not absolute. However, it notes that this principle 
is not originally of the Integration Law, to which belongs Mercosur, and shall 
therefore be only considered as a last resource. That is why it does not apply to the 


























Whether the import ban is an economic or environmental measure is hard to 
precise inasmuch there are an amount of determinant technical facts that remain 
controversial and rest beyond the study of law. At any rate, even if we deem the 
embargo to be economically driven, it would not properly justify the intriguing 
alteration of the Brazilian defense within Mercosur and the WTO, for it would 
obviously not prevent the possibility of making an environmental defense within 
both International Organizations and thus enhance the chances of having the ban 
accepted. A possible and better alternative interpretation for the defense alteration 
lies on a thinkable disinterest or underestimation by the Brazilian government of 
the contemporary environmental problematique. However, this possibility becomes 
harder to defend considering the internationally recognized advancement of the 
Brazilian environmental law.  
Given that, a different hypothesis, the most likely correct, was verified 
throughout this work. However, it was refuted. A juridical explanation to the 
Brazilian defense contradiction could only be the fact that the WTO provides the 
environment a chance that Mercosur does not. As it could be seen throughout this 
work, however, it is certainly not the case. The abrupt change of defense strategy 
appears thus to have no ground on international rules.  
It was demonstrated that Mercosur does boast a variety of environmental 
regulations and, what is the most important, a clear environmental exception to the 
free trade provisions of this TRA. Besides, the four criteria established by the TRP, 
although set after the dispute involving Brazil, shows a set of requirements in due 
harmony with those enunciated within the most important international fora, 
including the WTO. The TRP decision itself proceeded with each step always 
mentioning the understanding of the issue within the European Union129. 
The dispute involving Argentina and Uruguay was highly important to 
corroborate these conclusions. It reveals that the fact that, at the time of the 
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 The TPR took as a model the EU decision of December, 2004. Comisión/Alemania. C-463/01. Rec. P. I-
11705, apartado 75, and Radlberger Getrankegesellshaft y S. Spitz. C-309/02. Rec. P. I-11763, apartado 75. 
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Brazilian dispute, Mercosur lacked prior decisions on the environmental exception 
does not mean at all that this fact could actually happen to result detrimental to an 
environmental defense and thus justify the Brazilian conduct. If we ever considered 
this negative possibility, arguendo, it is obvious that to make the legal-economic 
considerations Brazil did also invoking the environmental exception could not result 
on a worst outcome to the Brazilian policy. It is exactly that that Argentina does, 
presenting an economic and environmental defense, clearly showing that the 
Brazilian actuation in court certainly involved a misstep.  
For sure, and once again the Argentinean case comes to demonstrate this, 
it does not mean that a Brazilian appeal to the environmental exception would 
inevitably result on the acceptance of the embargo by the Tribunals. However, the 
same case shows the perceptible one more time: a parallel environmental appeal 
would enhance considerably the chances of success. 
 To sum up, the fact that the environment was virtually overlooked within 
Mercosur during the Brazilian actuation has not an Integration Law130 basis. It does 
not mean that the acceptance of an environmental measure would be more likely 
accepted before WTO and not in Mercosur. As a matter of fact, the Mercosur 
understanding of the environmental exception is quite similar to that of other 
international fora. Accordingly, overlooking the environmental factor within 
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